Tangible–Intangible Factors Interaction on Hostility Escalation and Rivalry Endurance: The Case of India–Pakistan Rivalry

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Abstract

A major contribution of the enduring rivalry literature is that the same pair of states—commonly referred to as dyads—are the cause for the majority of violent territorial changes and low-intensity conflicts. Enduring rivalries account for almost half of the militarized disputes during the past 200 years. Expanding literature on enduring rivalries informs us that militarized disputes and crises are influenced by past outcomes, internal dynamics of conflict behaviour and the prospects of future disputes. This article focuses on the India–Pakistan enduring rivalry, which has persisted for 68 years, and this rivalry is marked by four wars, and numerous instances of asymmetric warfare. The India–Pakistan rivalry has proved to be the most enduring, and it simply does not show any sign of abatement, and this conflict has become nested within the Pakistan–Afghanistan and India–China regional rivalry and territorial dispute. In addition, the India–Pakistan enduring rivalry has also become deeply enmeshed in the American-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This article reviews the vast literature on enduring rivalry with particular focus on India–Pakistan to examine what factors have led to the persistence and exacerbation of this rivalry and why it is displaying no inclination towards termination.

Keywords

Enduring rivalries, India, Pakistan, terrorism, identity, nuclear weapons, territorial conflict

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> War tends to increase in severity and to decrease in frequency as the area of political and legal adjustment (the state) expands geographically unless the area becomes as broad as the area of continuous economic, social, and cultural contact (civilization).

> War tends to increase both in frequency and in severity in times of rapid technological and cultural change because adjustment, which always involves habituation, is a function of time. (Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 1942, p. 352)

Introduction

A major contribution of the enduring rivalry literature is that the same pair of states—commonly referred to as dyads—are the cause for the majority of violent territorial changes and low-intensity conflicts. An enduring rivalry is characterized by at least six militarized disputes during a 20-year period (Diehl, 1998; Goertz & Diehl, 2000). It has been estimated that only about five per cent of all 'rivalries develop into full-blown enduring rivalries', but once established, they last an average of four decades or longer (Goertz, Jones & Diehl, 2003). Enduring rivalries are characterized by zero-sum perceptions, and the states involved have become highly entrenched and consider each other as exceedingly threatening to their security and physical survival, as exemplified by the India–Pakistan rivalry that has endured over 68 years with four wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999, and numerous instances of major asymmetric warfare in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2008.[1] India and Pakistan are in a state of constant war readiness, and the exchange of fire along the Line of Control (LoC) is a frequent daily occurrence (Sharma & Kulkarni, 2015). This enduring rivalry has proved to be the most durable, and it simply does not show any sign of abatement, and this conflict has become nested within the Pakistan–Afghanistan and India–China regional rivalry and territorial dispute. The Cold War also profoundly influenced the India–Pakistan enduring rivalry and the bilateral relationship of the United States with India and Pakistan by pitting the American ally Pakistan against the Soviet-allied India. India–Pakistan rivalry became particularly exacerbated when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and the United States along with Pakistan's military ruler Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq launched covert warfare against the Soviets in Afghanistan. General Zia-ul-Haq asserted that Pakistan had 'earned the right' to establish a friendly regime in Kabul and his country would not countenance any 'Indian and Soviet influence' in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004, p. 175).

The Pakistan–Afghanistan border dispute over the Durand Line, which separates the two countries, and Pakistan's sustained interference in Afghan politics through Taliban and other proxies, and the equally long-standing rivalry and border dispute between India and China have become a part of the India–Pakistan rivalry. India has sought to exploit Pakistan's soft power weakness in Afghanistan by providing economic, medical, educational and civil assistance to Afghanistan, and Pakistan has sought to check India's progress by launching terror attacks against Indian targets in Afghanistan.[2] Moreover, Pakistan has sought to exploit the border conflict between India and China by developing a deep security relationship

with China. After the border war of 1962 along the disputed Himalayan borders, the Sino-Indian conflict has become a significant dimension of the India–Pakistan rivalry. A part of Kashmir under Pakistan's control–Shaksgam valley–was unilaterally transferred by Pakistan to China as per the Trans-Karakoram Pact, which was signed on 2 March 1963 that facilitated the construction of a road connecting Pakistan with China. This territorial transfer is still contested by India, which claims Shaksgam valley as a legitimate part of Kashmir.

The territorial and the broader strategic competition between India and Pakistan has not only generated angry and, oftentimes, highly hostile relations but also accelerated the conventional and nuclear arms race while both countries are perpetually in a state of military preparedness. Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) and Gibler, Rider and Hutchinson (2005) have argued that arms races are products of enduring rivalry processes rather than a consequence of war itself. Besides the United States, China has emerged the largest contributor of variety of sophisticated arms to Pakistan.[3] Active contribution of Chinese nuclear technology and materials, and missiles, has contributed to the expansion and development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, and exacerbated the nuclear dimension of the India–Pakistan enduring rivalry that eventually culminated in the retaliatory nuclear tests in 1998 (Smith & Warrick, 2009). Pakistan and China have developed a strategic relationship since the early 1960s from which both countries have benefited. China has provided direct assistance in 'building six nuclear reactors in Pakistan with a total installed capacity of 3.4 million kilowatts' (Parameswaran, 2015).

Heightened hostility between India and Pakistan has contributed to a complex regional rivalry that is thoroughly implicated in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) because of Pakistan's central role as a terror-repository state. Consequentially, the United States has become deeply enmeshed in this regional rivalry in an attempt to ensure that the GWOT is not disrupted because of India–Pakistan conflict. This article reviews the vast enduring rivalry literature with particular focus on India–Pakistan to examine what factors have led to the persistence—asymmetry, irredentism, national identities, nuclear weapons and terrorism—and exacerbation of this enduring rivalry and why it is displaying no signs of even inching towards termination or peaceful resolution.

Rivalries: What Do They Mean?

Scholarship on rivalries reveal that certain pairs of countries engage in repeated and deadly conflict and that they account for a disproportionate amount of the world's militarized conflicts (Diehl, 1985, 1998; Gochman & Maoz, 1984; Goertz & Diehl, 2001). The rivalry approach provides an effective mechanism to identify persistent and protracted conflict between two or more states (Chan, 2013; Diehl, 1996; Diehl, Bercovitch & Goertz, 1997; Paul, 2005). According to Goertz and Diehl (2000a), the concept of enduring rivalry provides an effective tool to identify persistent and protracted conflict between two or more states. Focusing on rivalries allows a scholar to define the theoretical and empirical parameters of the research question with greater precision and methodological formality. At the

level of generality, the term 'rivalry' produces the understanding that state X and state Y are hostile, they are competitors and they could rapidly transform from a competitive to an enduring rivalry (Goertz & Diehl, 1993). Hensel (1996) argues that the term 'rivalry' has been used to refer to 'pretensions and claims' and the effort made by two or more actors to outdo each other. The primary distinction between rivals and non-rivals is that rivals are engaged in some form of competition or contentious behaviour.

Maoz and Mor (2002, p. 5) define an enduring rivalry as a 'persistent, fundamental, and long-term incompatibility of goals between two states'. This incompatibility of objectives 'manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties towards each other, as well as in recurring violent or potentially violent clashes over a long period of time'. The divided region of Kashmir is one of the most contested lands in the world over which India and Pakistan have engaged in at least four major wars. The exchange of fire along the contested border is a daily occurrence that sometimes continues for several days that facilitates the infiltration of non-state actors (terror groups) into Indian-held Kashmir (*The Economic Times*, 19 August 2014). The intense rivalry is further intensified by the constant need to maintain strategic superiority, and the attempt by the revisionist actor—Pakistan—to constantly overturn the status quo.

The India–Pakistan rivalry meets all the four qualifications—an outstanding set of unresolved issues, strategic interdependence, psychological manifestations of enmity and repeated militarized conflict—identified by Maoz and Mor (2002, p. 5) for rivalry endurance. These four qualifications accurately describe the structure of enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan and, particularly, the psychological dimensions manifests very strongly in this rivalry. Public discourse carried through media and academic centres in both countries have heightened the distrust and mutual hatred. For instance, the educational system in Pakistan is structured in such a manner that hatred for India, exaggeration of stereotypical images of India and its religious practices and distortion of history are systematically carried out through school textbooks (Rosser, 2005; USCIRF, 2011).[4] Mistrust of Pakistan is equally widespread in India; according to a Pew Study on Global Attitudes, nearly 60 per cent of Indians view 'Pakistan as a *very* serious threat to India', and Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is seen as a menace by half of the country, and only 13 per cent of India views Pakistan favourably.[5] Although a plurality of views in India and Pakistan indicates that the territorial dispute over Kashmir is at the core of this rivalry, there is very little support to make any territorial concessions to each other.

Rivalry Dynamics

Militarized interstate disputes are influenced by past outcomes, and by the prospect of future disputes (Goertz & Diehl, 1993, 2000; Klein, Goertz & Diehl, 2001). Goertz and Diehl (1997, p. 3) point out that the term 'rivalry' has been used casually to characterize 'feelings of enmity between states' and that only few have attempted to conceptualize 'rivalry' as a concept that can be deployed both theoretically and

empirically. For example, McGinnis and Williams (1993) point out that United States and Soviet Union mutually recognized each other as rivals and this factor compelled them to engage in hyper-competitive behaviour such as arms race, strategic competition, nuclear posturing and proxy wars (also see Thompson, 1999).

Goertz and Diehl (2001, p. 18) note that rivalries are not just histories of conflicts because rivalries also involve expectations of future conflicts. Rivalries convey both a past and a future, which provides a basis for understanding the expected behaviour of states. Goertz and Diehl (2000) point out that traditional conflict studies, especially the 'causes of war' approach, tend to treat conflicts as independent occurrences and ignore the linkages between them over time and space.[6] The relation over time and space suggests that conflicts are not isolated occurrences but they create and define the structure of the rivalry relationship. The establishment of relation over space and time also allows the researcher utilizing the rivalry framework to theorize about the past and the expected future based on the spatial and temporal dimension of the rivalry relationship. In short, the rivalry approach provides a window for simultaneously accommodating both the past and the future within a single conceptual framework.[7] Goertz and Diehl (2000) contend that their move towards using 'rivalry' as the basic unit of analysis is a significant methodological and theoretical shift. The concept of rivalry, according to Goertz and Diehl (2000), allows the researcher to account for the temporal existence of a rivalry as a unit of analysis and move away from the concept of war, and it creates space to distinguish between 'wars' and 'rivalries'. The rivalry approach provides a framework to capture the patterns and dynamics of conflict escalation and de-escalation, which may or may not result in war.

Research on rivalries has tended to cluster around origination and termination of rivalries (Bercovitch, Goertz & Diehl, 1997; Goertz & Diehl, 1995), evolution of repetitive conflicts (Goertz & Diehl, 2000; Hensel, 1996), conflict management in enduring rivalries (Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997; Leng, 1993), dynamics of enduring rivalries (Diehl, 1998; McGinnis & Williams, 1993; Thompson, 1999), arms races and rivalry escalation in enduring rivalries (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998; Diehl & Crescenzi, 1998). Goertz and Diehl (1997, p. 4) stress the importance of treating 'rivalry' as a foundational concept to conceptualize interstate security relations, and they emphasize that the concept of enduring rivalries is unique because it highlights the enhanced risk of war between dangerous dyads that other definitions of conflict are not able to capture.

Attention has also been devoted to the importance of territory and geography in enduring rivalries (Huth, 1996; Rasler & Thompson, 2006; Tir & Diehl, 2002). One of the relational aspects emphasized by the enduring rivalry literature is the non-military dimension of conflict such as territory, especially contiguous territory, a joint or common history and identity differences over ethnicity, history, culture, religion and ideology are highly correlated with the exacerbation of the rivalries (Nasr, 2005). Scholars of rivalry argue that the presence of identity differences significantly reduces the chances of conflict resolution and increases the likelihood of escalation (Nasr, 2005; Newman, 1999). Religious difference between Muslims and Hindus was advanced as a major cause for the separation of British colonial possessions to establish two separate states—India and Pakistan—representing the

two conflicting faiths in South Asia. The resulting forcible partition, the violent and massive relocation of Hindus from Pakistan and Muslims from India and the carving out of two states based on opposing religious identity were the primary shocks that have produced one of the most enduring and dangerous rivalries (Dixit, 2003; Menon, 2013). As Stinnett and Diehl (2001) point out, rivalry development is influenced by the actions of the potential rivals during their early confrontations and their initial behaviour will establish the direction of future interactions.

Approaches to Understanding Rivalry

The rivalry approach to war and peace captures five basic properties of recurring conflict, which distinguishes it from other useful applications of the rivalry concept (Goertz & Diehl, 1993, 1997). First, the states have conflicting goals over the disposition of tangible or intangible properties (Diehl, 1998; Tir & Diehl, 2002). Second, the states repeatedly engage in militarized disputes over the same set of issues over an extended period of time. In some cases, the issues might change, but the same two states might continue to engage in conflict over different set of issues causing the rivalry to persist. Third, the conflict has a military dimension that involves the repeated use of military force to change the dynamics of the dispute. Fourth, the conflicts have a temporal dimension such that some conflicts might be isolated (isolated rivalry), some conflicts might be sporadic and will not last for a long time (proto-rivalry) and, in some cases, the rivalry could persist for decades (enduring rivalry) (Goertz & Diehl, 1993, 2000). The key point regarding temporality is that past conflicts increase the probability of future conflicts (Diehl, 1998). Fifth, the rivalries are spatially related, and in many cases, the rivalries occur between geographically contiguous states, and particularly over territory (Paul, 2005).

Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Paul (2005) point out that the concept of enduring rivalry is structured to capture the 'spatial consistency, duration, and militarized competition'. The notion of spatiality not only seeks to capture the dyadic nature of rivalries but also allows for the possibility of different types of rivalry alliances or multilateral rivalries, and it is simultaneously concerned with war and peace (Diehl, 2000; Goertz & Diehl, 1998). India–Pakistan conflict perfectly fits this categorization because repeated militarized competition between the same pair of states (or dyads) over an extended period of time defines the enduring character of this rivalry.

The basic rivalry level (BRL) approach or post hoc approach to rivalry indicates that early recognition by states that are involved in a rivalry relationship leads to maturation as long-standing rivals (Hensel, 1999a). This phenomenon is referred to as the lock-in effect; that is, when at the initial stage the states recognize each other as rivals, from that point onwards the rivalry endures until the termination. This behaviour is very evident in the case of India and Pakistan, a festering rivalry brewing over the unfairness of the territorial allocation during the partition of British India that culminated in the first India–Pakistan war in 1948. The partition and the first war in 1948 were the lock-in stages from which the India–Pakistan rivalry evolved and sustained itself through repeated military

competition. As Hensel (1999b) indicates, once the states are locked in a rivalry mode, the rivalry relationship between the two states rarely fluctuates.

Hensel (1999) also points out that once the rivalry is locked-in, it will become 'entrenched in domestic politics and foreign policy' of the rival states. The national security policy aimed at the rival state will become highly salient, and they will immediately start perceiving each other as the enemy. Another direct consequence of a locked-in rivalry is the rapid increase in military spending. When a rivalry rises to the level of national consciousness as in the case of India and Pakistan, the entire domestic political rhetoric is aimed at the rival.[8] Very often, military spending will keep pace with the political rhetoric, and it tends to receive strategic priority over other legitimate state expenditure. India and Pakistan are engaged in a compulsive arms race in which security dilemma has compelled both actors to move beyond the accumulation of extensive array of conventional weapons and transitioned towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Each country is now estimated to possess anywhere between 80 and 120 nuclear bombs and a variety of missile systems to deliver these weapons (Dalton & Tandler, 2012). India has declared that it will pursue a no-first-use nuclear doctrine, whereas Pakistan has stated that it will not pursue a no-first-use policy to deter surprise Indian attacks. Despite the structural asymmetry in some areas of conventional arms, the decision to add 'tactical nuclear weapons' with smaller warheads for battlefield deployment has given Pakistan a significant deterrence capacity (*New York Times*, 23 March 2015). But this move is likely to cause tremendous uncertainty and increase the probability of nuclear exchange through escalation or accidental use.

Rivalry Onset

With the onset of the rivalry after the partition of British India in 1947, the two rivals have fought over every aspect of partition—allocation of territory, drawing of boundary, sharing of river waters, splitting of the British Indian armed forces, relocation of population during and after the partition and now over their status and political standing in the international system. Hence, Fair (2014, p. 4) argues that Pakistan's fundamental objective is to 'not only undermine the territorial status quo in Kashmir but also to undermine India's position in the region and beyond'. To realize this goal, Pakistan's military would be willing to suffer as many defeats as possible, but would not acquiesce to India; such acquiescence would mark the total defeat of the Pakistani state and its army.

Referring to the Prussian army, Voltaire remarked, 'Where some states have an army, the Prussian Army has a state!' This aphorism most aptly applies today to Pakistan, where the military has a state (*The Economist*, 20 September 2014). The armed forces and the intelligence services of Pakistan have singularly benefited from this rivalry, as they are the most organized, well funded and wield enormous political and economic power within the state.[9] The Pakistani military has ruled the state on several occasions (1958–1971 and 1977–1988), and most recently from 1999 to 2008 by General Pervez Musharraf, immediately following the

fourth India–Pakistan war in 1999. The entire political edifice of Pakistan and its national identity structure is built on the singular fact that it is the opposite of India in every way, and that the root cause of all its domestic and international ills is a consequence of the rivalry with India and its inability to alter the prevailing status quo (Cohen, 2011; Fair, 2014; Haqqani, 2013; Markey, 2013; Paul, 2005).

Civilian politicians and the military leadership in Pakistan have maintained an extraordinarily hawkish position vis-à-vis its rival, but the domestic politics of Pakistan leaves very little wiggle room for alternative or moderate views to prevail (Haqqani, 2013). The hawkish views towards the rival are simply not instrumental, although both the military and the jihadi groups have the most to benefit from this rivalry, but more importantly, these actors have come to believe and unquestioningly assign the responsibility for their internal and external failings on the unfinished national project of Pakistan, which is on the other side of the disputed border (Siddiqa, 2007).

India and Pakistan demonstrate a very high degree of hostility and competitive behaviour both in terms of rhetoric and in terms of accumulation of military power. The consequence of this hostility and competitive behaviour is that it will prolong the rivalry and politicians in rival states will seek to undercut anyone seeking resolution (Hensel, 1999; Paul, 2005, 2014). So in this case, the national identity and security policy of Pakistan, and the political standing of the Pakistani military, are inextricably tied to the sustenance of the rivalry (Siddiqa, 2007). Unless one party to the conflict ultimately surrenders, concedes or ceases to exist as a state, the rivalry will continue unabated. However, such a surrender or concession seems impossible under the current conditions because it would imply that the Pakistani identity project has failed, and the Pakistani army will never concede to that (Fair, 2014). Besides, there is no broad political coalition or strong constituency in India that has made peace with Pakistan a core political issue.

Why Rivalries Endure?

Enduring rivalries have received widespread scholarly attention because of their policy relevance and theoretical value. Conflict scholars are puzzled as to why the same pair of states engage in repeated conflict (Goertz & Diehl, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000; Hensel, 1996; Huth, 1996; Maoz & Mor, 2002). Answers to the question of why rivalries endure can be generally organized into three categories: rivalry origination, rivalry dynamics and rivalry termination (Diehl, 1998; Goertz & Diehl, 2000; Paul, 2005). Although the issues of rivalry origination, dynamics and termination are highly interrelated, the literature on rivalries has tended to organize them into discrete categories for analytical purposes. Rivalry onset and rivalry termination are a part of the same problem, or two sides of the same coin, and rivalry endurance is intimately tied to the issue of how a rivalry originates and what is the likelihood of its termination. Rivalry dynamics seeks to examine the patterns of behaviour within rivalries such as escalation and de-escalation of armed hostilities and arms racing (Goertz & Diehl, 1998), preference change and learning (Maoz & Mor, 2002), and stability of rivalries (Cioffi-Revilla, 1998).

Research on rivalry termination and origination has generated a host of independent variables that range from exogenous to endogenous political shocks, such as, the eruption or the sudden conclusion of world wars, violent territorial change, civil war and domestic regime change that may involve military coups, violent takeovers or shift towards democratic politics. Political shocks, particularly sudden and unanticipated political shocks, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to the end of the Cold War, is one such instance that could lead to rivalry termination (Goertz & Diehl, 1995). Exogenous political shocks are associated with rivalry termination and origination because they reconfigure the power parity structure and alter the geo-strategic balance. Similarly, domestic political change that particularly erupts as civil war or regime change that favours one group over another could produce new actors and exacerbate existing rivalries.

Conflict resolution, political shocks, alliance formation and peaceful resolution of outstanding territorial disputes and domestic political change are few of the factors that lead to rivalry termination. In particular, conflict management among rivalries is generally associated with modest increase in the waiting time between disputes (Bercovitch & Diehl, 1997). Others have also found that the availability of conflict management and containment mechanisms among enduring rivals enhances the chances of rivalry termination (Goertz & Regan, 1997). Various extensions of the democratic peace theory also indicate that there is a strong statistical correlation between interstate peace and joint democracy (Hensel, Goertz & Diehl, 2000). In short, the larger body of work associated with democratic peace theory clearly indicates that domestic political structure, regime change and the nature of pressure politics will influence the conflict proneness of a state and the origination, sustenance and termination of rivalries.

Rivalries endure because of the inability of the states to resolve their outstanding disputes either militarily or peacefully, and when the impact of external or internal shocks, which have the capability to end rivalries, is non-existent. This answer automatically begs the question: Why aren't enduring rivalries unable to resolve their conflicts? Besides the usual tangible variables such as domestic regime change and the strategic value of territory, intangibles or the ideational dimension is also identified as one of the key factors in rivalry endurance and rise in hostility levels. Rivalry scholars acknowledge that rivalries with an intangible dimension will prove to be intractable and unyielding to mediation efforts (Diehl, 1998; Huth, 1996; Newman, 1999; Paul, 2005; Tir & Diehl, 2002).

Why Rivalries Endure: The Intangible Dimension

Intangibles are defined in relation or in opposition to the tangibles, which are issues that have a fungible dimension, such as, finance or reparations, territorial resources, foreign aid, military troops, arms race, nuclear weapons, alliances, size of foreign trade and demarcation of the border areas (Rosenau, 1974). Issues that normally consist of moral, religious, ethnic and ideological dimension are generally referred to as intangibles. These issues generate increased interaction between states and more sustained contention because, unlike tangible issues, intangibles

resemble a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all. As Rosenau (1974) maintains, conflict between dissimilar states is likely to be greater because of differences over religion, social values and political traditions. This is perfectly revealed by the India–Pakistan rivalry, where identity issues and the radicalization of the Islamist groups have heightened the growing divide between a democratic, outward-looking and prosperous India and a regressive Pakistan torn asunder by internal divisions, domestic terrorism, irredentism and civil conflict. Intangibles tend to produce high levels of sustained hostility between rival dyads because of the emotional nature of the conflict and the long history associated with the conflict (Nasr, 2005). In a major nationally televised address, former president of Pakistan, General Musharraf, claimed that 'Kashmir runs in our blood' and that no 'Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir' (BBC News, 12 January 2002). General Musharraf went on to assert that his government will continue to extend 'moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris' and that Pakistan would never budge from its principled stand on Kashmir.

Many conflict scholars find that presence of intangibles makes conflict resolution difficult because of its high issue salience, which reduces the possibility of mutually abandoning the issue (Diehl, 1998; Huth, 1996; Rosenau, 1974; Tir & Diehl, 2002). Although the issue of intangibles and issue salience has been recognized within rivalry research, the mechanisms or the paths of influence of the intangibles have not received sufficient attention. Singer (1993) argued that:

> identities that people inherit and/or acquire make them more ready to line up against those with different identities, and while material calculations of state interest are clearly at work in the onset and perpetuation of conflict and rivalry, there is little question that cultural identities contaminate and interact with such calculations in moving states toward armed conflict.[10]

As the former Pakistani ambassador to the United States argues, immediately after the partition, '"Islamic Pakistan" was defining itself through the prism of resistance to "Hindu India".'

Intangibles and Identity

National interests and identity are constituted sociologically through a set of political practices; they are not natural facts, that is, they are not prior to the social context of the state, but are social and cultural productions that are designed to serve specific political purposes (Campbell, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996). Presence of differences over race, religion, ethnicity, values and social norms between groups of people or states does not automatically lead to conflict. The social mechanisms through which the political actors influence or shape the identity relations and how this in turn affects the conflict and cooperative behaviour of the states is critical in understanding why some rivalries endure. Identities, as Huntington (2001) points out, are multiple, and they could operate at any level—individual, racial, tribal or national—and they are understood in relation to the 'other'. In short, identities

enable separation into 'us' versus 'them' on the basis of differences that constitute and organize them such as 'us civilized' against 'them barbarians'.

Very rarely do we find rivalries without a tangible conflict dimension. Bennett's coding notes for the enduring rivalry data reveal that all of the 74 different rivalries from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had or have a territorial dispute.[11] Although the dynamics of each dispute is different among the 74 enduring rivalries, all of them have a clear tangible conflict dimension. Some enduring rivalries last longer and are far more hostile than the others because of intangibles. Interaction of intangibles with tangible factors exacerbates the hostilities between the rivals. The division of a piece of territory—especially one which has highly symbolic value, such as Kashmir—between two states becomes a difficult task, when the dominant identities of the two states are located in the opposing ends of the ethno-religious spectrum. The ethno-religious groups within each state will attempt to prevent a peaceful solution because they favour a zero-sum settlement, that is, extending a full claim over such symbolic territory because it is foundational to the identity project. When a tangible element such as a territorial dispute is combined with intense identity differences, especially between geographically proximate rivals, it provides an irreversible path to rivalry. Utilizing ethnic, religious and cultural elements to reinforce national identity in relation to the rival state is a normal strategy (Newman, 1999). However, this also poses challenges because this generates the identity dilemma problem. When a state seeks to reinforce its identity in relation to another state—particularly a proximate rival—the rival state will indulge in a similar process. This will set in motion a set of process that can eventually escalate beyond war of words between rival dyads that are already engaged in a conflict over tangible goods (see Figure 1).

Moreover, cross-national ethno-religious variations can manifest in different configurations within the domestic institutional context. Political leaders will seek to divert the virulence of radical elements within their state into the rival state. In Pakistan, the military has adopted the tactic of sponsoring and training terrorist groups against the rival states, encouraged proxy wars to consolidate their power and muzzled opposing domestic political groups to ensure their hegemony (Siddiqa, 2007). The interaction of tangible and intangible variables in the domestic institutional context under the rubric of identity politics will worsen the hostility levels, prolong the rivalries and pave the way for militarized conflicts (see Figure 1).


Figure 1. A Model of Rivalry Endurance
Source: Author's own

Origins of the India–Pakistan Enduring Rivalry

As the British imperialism was reaching its zenith, the Indian National Congress (INC) was established in 1885 (Edwardes, 1961). The INC became the primary vehicle through which Gandhi launched the Indian independence movement. When it became clear that the British were in favour of granting some regional autonomy to the Indians, the Indian Muslims founded the Muslim League in 1906 to represent the Muslim community. The colonial government actively encouraged and supported the formation of the Muslim League in the hopes of using it as a political counterweight against the nationalist aspirations of the INC.

To the Muslim nationalists, the conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims became a rallying point for making a claim to an independent Muslim-majority state. The movement for the establishment of a separate Muslim and Hindu state carved out of colonial British India was articulated by the Muslim League as the Two-Nation theory. League leaders argued that the incompatibility between Hindus and Muslims for over thousand years is sufficient to warrant the creation of separate states because of the fear that the Muslim minority will be dominated early by the Hindu majority (Edwardes, 1961). Initially, when this idea was proposed in the freedom movement, it was met with widespread resistance from the British, Hindus and from many Muslim leaders as well. However, by mid-1930s, the Two-Nation theory started receiving widespread support among the Muslim League leaders. The Muslim elite saw that the creation of an independent state would enable them to reinforce their power and elite status, and rescue them from competing with Hindu leaders, such as, Gandhi, Nehru and Patel, under the confederation of India. Hence, the Two-Nation theory became a strategic and opportunistic political tool to manipulate the Muslim community to achieve their objectives. A predominantly Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan was ostensibly to overcome the ethnic incompatibility, but the splintering of British India along ethno-religious lines also laid the foundation for the enduring India–Pakistan rivalry.

Partition, Territorial Competition and the First India–Pakistan War

The British plan to partition India was announced on 3 June 1947. In less than a month, the Boundary Commission was assigned the task of territorial division of India, and by mid-August 1947, two new countries were carved out of the British colonial state (Bhutalia, 1998). Ethno-religious extraterritoriality was the primary rule through which the division of India was executed. Any contiguous area consisting of majority Muslim population was to belong to Pakistan and the non-Muslim areas were to be assigned to India. The complex process of division of territory, water resources and population took place under the shadow of violence between the Hindus, Muslims and various other ethnic groups. When India was partitioned, Pakistan was given control of territory both on the eastern side of India (formerly East Pakistan, Bangladesh since 1971) and on the western part of India (Islamic Republic of Pakistan), and the status of Princely State of Kashmir was left unresolved.

Immediately after the partition, fear and insecurity among the Hindus in Pakistan and the Muslims in India led to a massive movement of population on both sides of the border, which imploded into an orgy of violence on an unimaginable scale. Former neighbours and friends killed, maimed and raped each other, and the communally divided police forces on both sides joined the violence instead of maintaining law and order (Bhutalia, 1998). The trauma of partition had barely subsided when the first Indo-Pakistani war (1947–1948) began over Kashmir. Somewhere around late October 1947, a group of 2000 *lashkars* (tribal militia) crossed over to Kashmir and seized a border town (Ganguly, 1994). Within three days, the Maharaja of Kashmir, who until then was undecided as to whether to join Pakistan or India, formally acceded to India. Immediately thereafter, the ground battle began in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The first Indo-Pakistani war was not only costly in terms of human lives, but it resulted in the partition and occupation of Kashmir by Indian and Pakistani military. United Nations (UN) mediation brought the military conflict to an end in early 1949, but it did not fundamentally resolve the territorial dispute (Ganguly, 1994).

The origins of the India–Pakistan rivalry can be attributed to the emergence of strong communal divide between the Hindus and Muslims during the last two centuries of British rule. When the competition for resources, wealth and power was manifested along ethno-religious lines, the disagreements between the Hindus and Muslims became shrill and divisive. Muslims argued that their life, liberty and religious freedom would be threatened under a large Hindu state. Indian nationalist movement leaders argued that the Muslims had nothing to fear under the secular state of India, and they were promised special concessions. However, the efforts to accommodate the Muslim League demands produced large protests by the Hindu majority. Some political groups, such as, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), argued that the Muslims were benefiting at the expense of the Hindus. Such uncompromising sentiments led to periodic violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims in cities with mixed populations, which further reinforced the divisions between the Hindus and Muslims. When India was partitioned and the populations were relocated under traumatic circumstances, they carried with them centuries-old hatred, which was re-articulated into nationalism and territorial conflict in both countries.

Identity Struggles, Domestic Politics and Rivalry Endurance

The Two-Nation theory that led to the partition generated two sets of unanticipated problems. First, the Hindus and Muslims did not form coherent territorial communities; they were settled all over the South Asian subcontinent. Relocating the geographically disparate communal groups into coherent territorial units created a logistical nightmare. Second, uniting the disparate ethnic groups into the newly created entity of Pakistan produced enormous identity challenges. Pakistan turned towards Islam to create a common national identity, while India turned towards a combination of Hinduism, democracy, liberal nationalism and socialism to form a secular state (Khilnani, 1999). Both states were desperately seeking

to prevent ethno-nationalist movements and unify the diverse ethnic groups into a coherent national unit. Simultaneously, they were also involved in a political and military competition to define the political and geographic boundaries of their newly established states.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir became the flashpoint for the Indo-Pakistani conflict. To India, Kashmir is not only a strategic bridgehead but also an ideological commitment, which demonstrates that Muslims could thrive under a secular India and discredit the Two-Nation theory. To Pakistan, besides the obvious territorial benefits, incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan represents the fulfilment of its core national objective that simultaneously discredits India's secularism and its territorial size. This goal became particularly urgent after the 1971 war, which led to the creation of a new country in the form of Bangladesh and a reduction in the territorial size of Pakistan. The first war in 1948, the second war in 1965, the third war in 1971, the first Indian nuclear tests in 1974, the Brasstacks crisis in 1987, the nuclear crisis of 1990, the retaliatory nuclear tests in 1998, the Kargil war in 1999 and the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008 are military manifestations of the deep-seated enduring ethno-religious rivalry. Periodic military clashes also reflect the underlying domestic political tensions, which India and Pakistan seek to export across their borders to increase their domestic political support. Conflict over Kashmir has provided Pakistan with the opportunity to consolidate its national identity and divert attention from its other pressing socio-economic problems.

Both countries have shown deep reluctance to resolve the Kashmir issue because both governments are unwilling to even consider the possibility of ceding any territory or seeking a grand bargain. Any suggestions of territorial settlement or formal partition of Kashmir invoke inevitable comparisons to the failure of partition of British India. Many leaders of the current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) consider Pakistan to be an illegitimate rump state, and they desire to unite Pakistani territory with India's under the banner of *Akhand Bharat* (Greater India). To Pakistan, Kashmir needs to be incorporated into the state of Pakistan to complete the unfinished process of nation building because after all the letter 'K' in Pakistan stands for Kashmir.

Similarly, India contends that if Kashmir is not fully incorporated into the federation of Indian states, it will produce political forces that eventually lead to the Balkanization of India. Since both countries consider yielding on Kashmir to be nearly impossible, the India-Pakistan rivalry has become highly intractable and enduring. There has been no sustained political dialogue between both states to resolve the Kashmir issue through formal negotiations. The Agra summit (July 2001) failed when India and Pakistan could not even arrive at a mutually agreeable wording for joint declaration. Prior to that the Lahore bus diplomacy failed in 1999 when Pakistan's military crossed the LoC that resulted in the Kargil War. The emergence of powerful jihadi actors, employed as a tool of asymmetric warfare by Pakistan to realize its strategic objectives, has further complicated the Indo-Pakistani rivalry (Paul, 2005). Various militant groups have started engaging in sustained low-intensity conflict in Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan claims that it has very little control over these jihadi groups, but it acknowledges that it would

continue to provide moral support to the jihadi forces because of common ideological commitment (Fair, 2014; Haqqani, 2013; Paul, 2014; Siddiqa, 2007).

India–Pakistan Conflict Dynamics

India–Pakistan conflict is influenced by external and extra-regional geo-strategy as it is by internal domestic factors. The Indian military is not particularly interested in pursuing pre-emptive use of force strategies with Pakistan, and it has evolved a position of strategic restraint or defensive posture and prefers status quo ante vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indian position has evolved against the use of force even when it is provoked because the costs of a full-scale military conflict would far outweigh the benefits. Leading American nuclear experts, George Perkovich and Ashley Tellis, in a testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Subcommittee argued that 'Pakistan may use nuclear weapons against India if the latter goes for a large scale military assault against it in retaliation for a major terror attack emanating from across the border' (*Economic Times*, 26 February 2015). The consequences of a conventional conflict escalating into nuclear, even if limited, would be devastating for both India and Pakistan. Given the geographic proximity, India's military options are aimed at deterring Pakistan; consequentially, the available military options are somewhat restricted for India. So, even after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, despite vociferous demands for retaliatory action against Pakistan by various domestic constituencies, India did not respond with tit-for-tat military action; instead, India resorted to diplomatic isolation of Pakistan and suspended all other forms of engagement.

Aware of the military threat posed by Pakistan, India has heightened its deterrence posture by upgrading its military hardware and technology and increased the size and strength of its forces. Since India transformed itself into a global economy from the early 1990s and joined the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group, it has also become less interested in jeopardizing its growth prospects, disrupting the inflow of foreign direct investment and interrupting the torrid pace of construction. India has become more interested in the development of industrial and urban infrastructure and meeting the rising demands of the burgeoning middle class, which is more focused on economic and social welfare than engaging in military conflict with its insecure neighbour. Government of India has also become more self-aware and confident of its international stature, even winning the public support of the United States for a permanent seat in the reformed UN Security Council.

The growing border tension with China and sustained rivalry with Pakistan has compelled India to focus security threats from two powerful states. One particular challenge for India is the possibility of fighting a two-front war in which while it is fending simultaneous Chinese parries into the Northeast and into the Aksai Chin region, and if Pakistan opens another front in Kashmir and in India's Western front, India has to muster the military capacity to confront China and Pakistan (Blumenthal, 2010; Pant, 2010). Simultaneously confronting China and Pakistan would be a

forbidding task and the costs would be highly prohibitive. The 'string of pearls' strategy that China is ostensibly developing to encircle India with China-friendly regimes and deep-water ports that would facilitate quick naval assaults or blockade Indian shipping routes is worrying India enormously. The growing assertiveness of China on border issues, importantly in regards to the disputed border areas in the Northeast, and its decision to needle India in Kashmir by issuing separate visas to Kashmiri residents that is stapled to the back of the Indian passports and not stamped on the passport, and the denial of visas for some citizens from north-eastern India, have given India some serious worries about Chinese intentions. India has moved closer to Washington, which has welcomed India's overtures on China, but has not sought to forcefully counter China by allying with India, and neither has India warmed up to American invitation regarding the China threat (Montgomery, 2013).

India–Pakistan relationship has always been fragile because Pakistan is a weak state with dysfunctional government institutions that is heavily dependent on its military and intelligence services to manage Pakistan's foreign policy. In addition, Pakistan's foreign policy–military–intelligence–terror nexus is entirely India centric, and every policy is filtered through the prism of conflict with India (Cohen, 2006). As Siddiqa (2004) observes, Pakistan is unwavering in its resolve to compete with a larger neighbour that has global ambitions and it is insecure over India's rise. Pakistani national identity is so intimately intertwined with its territorial conflict over Kashmir and the larger strategic competition with India. Similarly, India has never really come to terms with the partition of British India, and it still holds enormous and unresolved grievances over the abrupt territorial dissolution and the consequences of partition. On the other hand, Pakistan believes that the partition of British India is still incomplete without Kashmir. External threat from India, religious national identity, irredentism and deep insecurity have powered Pakistan's military to take charge of foreign and security policy. The non-military elite in Pakistan has 'never seriously challenged the military's advantage or influence' in domestic politics (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 23). Pakistan's military and its feared intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), rely exclusively on hard power and on terror proxies to pursue Pakistan's foreign and security objectives. This is not just in its relations with India, but Pakistan relies on a similar strategy with its northern neighbour Afghanistan. Writing in *New York Times*, Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan in 2011–2013 argued that sponsoring of terror proxies or militants 'remains an instrument of its foreign policy' and that the 'Pakistani military treats the Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset' (Daudzai, 2015).

India alternatively has become more reliant on soft power to push its foreign policy objectives. In the immediate aftermath of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, there was enormous pressure to launch reprisal attacks on Pakistan. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Singh's government was less than eager to carry out US-style raids or air attacks on Pakistani terror camps because of escalation worries and American pressure. India's posture of strategic restraint could very easily be upset if another Mumbai-style terror attacks were to occur because domestic pressure to launch military strikes against Pakistan would be overwhelming. If India were to launch surgical air strikes against terrorist

camps located in Pakistani territory, it would surely invite a strong counter-attack, which could very quickly escalate into full-scale and unpredictable military conflict.

Asymmetric Warfare and Rivalry Dynamics

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the security architecture of South Asia changed dramatically. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, India–Pakistan security competition was not directly consequential to American national security. Both United States and the former Soviet Union exited the South Asian theatre in 1989, leaving Pakistan with enormous security and economic challenges as well as opportunities. Pakistan filled the security vacuum in Afghanistan through a set of proxy forces and relied on them to launch significant attacks on Indian targets in Kashmir and in other parts of India, and ignited a mass insurgency against India in Kashmir valley.

Pakistani-sponsored insurgency and terrorism propelled the right-wing Hindu nationalists (BJP) to power in India, and it decided to secretly test a nuclear weapon to consolidate its political power. The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 and the retaliatory nuclear tests by Pakistan shattered all illusions of peace in the region, and it swiftly demonstrated how dangerous the neighbourhood had become. The Kargil War in the high mountains of Kashmir, a year after the nuclear tests, elevated global tensions to an extraordinary level, drawing the United States back into the South Asian theatre a decade after it hastily exited the region. A few months after the Kargil War, General Pervez Musharaff took power in Pakistan in a bloodless coup and declared a state of emergency, and shortly thereafter, an Indian Airlines flight IC-814 en route from Kathmandu to New Delhi was hijacked by Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), a Pakistan-based terror group, on 24 December 1999. The plane eventually landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan; at the airport, the Taliban fighters ringed the plane. The remaining passengers in the Indian Airlines flight IC-814 were allowed to disembark from the hijacked flight only after three terrorists were released from Indian prisons. One of them, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, masterminded the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and was personally involved in the kidnapping and slaying of the *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002 in Pakistan.

The attacks on US targets on 11 September 2001 by 19 hijackers trained in Afghanistan by Al-Qaida and sponsored by terror facilitators in Pakistan drew the United States back into the region (Rashid, 2008). The American re-entry into the South Asian sphere was a game changer in the India–Pakistan conflict dynamics, because this time gradually the United States came around to the position that Pakistan had indeed become the official purveyor of international terrorism and that it trains, funds, harbours and utilizes terror groups as shock troops to advance its foreign policy objectives. Presently, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that Islamabad has played a double game with the United States by using an array of terror groups to target American positions in Afghanistan, attack supply convoys that pass through Pakistan and launch attacks on Indian and other

Western assets in Pakistan and Afghanistan while nominally appearing to cooperate with the United States (Gall, 2014a, 2014b).

The strategy that Pakistan has employed against the United States is no different from the strategy that it has pursued against India in the last several decades starting in the mid-1980s. Pakistan has been collecting American economic and military aid and other monetary parachutes to keep it afloat and only nominally attempted to fight back against jihadis based in North Waziristan, Quetta and other parts of Pakistan (Goldberg & Ambinder, 2011). There is overwhelming evidence that Pakistani intelligence has aided, abetted and coordinated direct assaults on the international forces in Afghanistan. Although American military planners are aware of the double game and other strategies employed by Pakistan to subvert international pressure, United States is dependent on Pakistan for supply routes into Afghanistan and for tactical support in the use of drones to target terror camps along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border (Wright, 2011).

What we see in Pakistan in the post-Soviet Afghanistan era is the increasing Islamization and radicalization that some refer to as the Talibanization of Pakistan (Goodson, 2012; Mir, 2010; Rashid, 2001). This extremism has seeped into the daily life of Pakistanis and radicalized the opportunity-less youth who have turned against their own people in launching brutal terror attacks and have started to propagate the jihadi culture beyond the region. Pakistan's terror habit has become its crutch, its go-to strategy for exercising power outside its territorial domain (Taqi, 2014). Pakistan relies on terrorism or asymmetric warfare to not only counterbalance India and pursue strategic depth in Afghanistan, but terrorism and its nuclear arsenal have become a survival strategy for this country with widening income inequality and growing social fissures. In addition, terror proxies and its nuclear arsenal have become tools for the Pakistan military to extract resources and checkmate external actors, particularly the United States, challenge neighbours, especially India, and hold together an increasingly fragmenting state (Siddiqa, 2007). Although the collapse of the Pakistani state maybe exaggerated, growing instability, high levels of internal violence and extremism, coupled with unemployment and income inequality, have catapulted Pakistan to 13th on the *Foreign Policy* magazine's Failed State Index and earned a ranking within the top-10 in the State Fragility Index.[12]

The military establishment in Pakistan has always differentiated between pro-Pakistan and anti-India terror groups. The support is always readily available to anti-India groups and to anti-Afghan government groups, and very surreptitious support is also lent to anti-Western terror groups, but anti-Pakistan terror outfits, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that occupied the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the capital city of Islamabad, are immediately routed. The Pakistani army has been willing to confront anti-Pakistan terror groups that also happen to be anti-American on occasion, but it actively encourages and supports anti-India terror groups such as the LeT, Harakat ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) and HuM that are also anti-Western in its foundational characteristics. However, this complex balancing strategy is starting to misfire at several levels.

The worrisome trend is that there is a growing collusion between anti-Kabul Pashtun groups and anti-Islamabad Punjabi groups, which is starting to upend

some of Pakistan's terror balancing strategy because both of them seem to be turning against their master. But, Islamabad is confident that it can manipulate the different jihadi groups to achieve its strategic objectives, but the escalation and frequency of terrorist violence within Pakistan suggest that Islamabad may not be fully in charge of every militant unit. In December 2014, in a brazen attack, the Pakistani Taliban attacked an army school in the frontier city of Peshawar and gunned down 133 children (BBC News, 2014; Saifi & Botelho, 2014). In the first few months of this year, 226 civilians, 29 security personnel and 412 terrorists have perished in Pakistan due to terror incidents. It is estimated that from 2003 to 2015, nearly 57,000 have been killed because of terrorist violence in Pakistan.[13]

The United States is fighting its own war along the frontier lands of Afghanistan–Pakistan border largely aided by drones. Pakistan is facing a losing battle against a virulent domestic insurgency, and the connections between groups that Pakistan is secretly aiding and those that the United States is fighting against are increasing. For the last four years in a row, US favourability ratings in Pakistan have averaged around 13 per cent, a dramatic decline from a high of 27 per cent in 2006. In the Pew Poll conducted in 2012, nearly three-fourths of Pakistanis perceive the United States as an enemy, and this feeling is mutual because only 10 per cent of Americans believe Pakistan is trustworthy (Pew Research Center, 2012; Wike, 2013). India is watching all of this from the sidelines, unwilling to be drawn into the battle against anti-India groups operating from the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK or Azad Kashmir) and the federated tribal areas in Pakistan. If India were to directly enter into this conflict with the intent of going after anti-India terror groups operating out of Pakistan, it would enormously complicate American efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hence, India has adopted the posture of strategic restraint, and it is positioning itself for the consequences of American withdrawal from the Afghanistan.

Though there is broad support (over 80 per cent)[14] in India to negotiate over Kashmir, policymakers in New Delhi are less sanguine about negotiating with a fissiparous state on key and pivotal matters. Besides, the military is unwilling to allow the civilian government of Pakistan to drive its foreign policy or extend the hand of peace with India. Meanwhile in India, there is absolutely no willingness to concede any additional territory on Kashmir, which was splintered during the first India–Pakistan war of 1948. Prior to the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, India was seeking normalization of relations so that Pakistan is no longer tempted to launch cross-border terror attacks, but India does not seem to be in any concessionary mood as it was during the heyday of peace breakthroughs achieved during the Vajpayee–Musharaff era when the respective leaders were able to punch through domestic opposition in search of grand bargains. India perceives Pakistan to be a jealous, duplicitous, conniving and extremist state, and there is very little sympathy or goodwill towards Pakistan. According to the Pew Poll published in spring 2012, more than 60 per cent of Indians view Pakistan and its most favoured terror proxy LeT (46 per cent) as a serious security threat.[15] On the other side, a similar view prevails with nearly equal percentage of Pakistanis view India as a major security threat.

Conclusion

The utility of 'rivalry' as a unit of analysis is that it provides a conceptual foundation to theorize indirectly about war by following the paths to war. Instead of directly attempting to explain the causes of war, a researcher can focus on arms race, rivalry dynamics and dispute escalation within the context of rivalry. The rivalry approach can be utilized to understand the conditions that compel two countries to repeatedly engage in military conflict. The rivalry approach also provides meaning to state behaviour by contextualizing state actions within the rivalry framework. The superiority of the rivalry framework is that it encompasses the competitive and conflictual behaviour of the states. The answers to why rivalries endure and do not endure over long periods of time can be generated from within the rivalry framework without having to rely on extra-systemic influences. Goertz and Diehl (1995) point out that in general the rivalry approach can accommodate both enduring and non-enduring rivalries within its theoretical framework by providing space for conceptual separation between different types of rivalries.

Enduring rivalries are also nested in regional security systems that facilitate their survival and sustenance. The rivalries are sustained by the nature of their competitive relationship that locks in early with rivalry onset and the complexities of domestic identity relationships, and politics within each state propels the rivalry. Enduring rivalries are not just isolated incidents connected by a series of militarized disputes, but they are fundamentally linked by the logic of longstanding rivalry dynamics that characterize them. Such rivalries are connected not only by the nature of relations between the rival states, but also by the regional security complex within which they operate. The India–Pakistan rivalry cannot be understood in isolation from the India–China rivalry and the China–Pakistan alliance. Similarly, the India–Pakistan rivalry during the Cold War cannot be understood from isolation of the Indo-Soviet-Afghani friendship or the US–Pakistan–China nexus. In the post–Cold War era, the South Asian security complex has to be understood from the perspective of growing linkages between Pakistan and its terror proxies that seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and the desire to wrest Kashmir from India, and the continued development of the security relationship between Pakistan and China.

Wars and recurring militarized conflict between the same set of dyads indicate that the enduring rivals lack both internal and external mechanisms for dispute resolution. The irreconcilable differences between two states that are rooted in a common and deep-seated historical identity differences that generally consist of intangibles such as religion and ideology, in addition to a divisive territorial dispute as in the case of India and Pakistan, make such rivalries highly enduring. The institutionalization of these identity differences and their repeated articulation through political mechanisms ensure the lengthening of the enduring rivalries. The nature of political relations between India and Pakistan is characterized by an enormous lack of trust and strong unwillingness to compromise.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. What is described as asymmetric warfare in the enduring rivalries literature is commonly identified as cross-border terrorism or low-intensity conflict within area studies and in the popular press. Cross-border terrorism refers to Pakistan's strategy of sending in armed insurgents across the border into Kashmir and other parts of India to launch terror attacks. The Mumbai terror attacks of 2008 that targeted the luxury Taj Hotel, a Jewish cultural centre, a busy train station and a popular coffee house in Mumbai in which 172 perished and 304 were injured.
2. The Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan, and several other locations has come under repeated attack by Pakistan-supported insurgents (Kumar, 2014; Qureshi, 2014).
3. According to the data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2008 to 2012, Pakistan purchased in 55 per cent of arms from China, making it the fifth largest arms exporter in the world (SIPRI, 2013).
4. In a large-scale study sponsored by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and conducted by the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) found that Pakistan's public schools and religious schools (madrasas) portray the Pakistan's religious minorities in completely negative manner, and they strongly reinforce existing biases that lead to active and violent discrimination. In addition, this study also found that Hindus, Christians and Jews were portrayed very negatively and it promoted hatred.
5. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Chapter 2. India and Pakistan, 10 September 2012. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/09/10/chapter-2-india-and-pakistan/
6. The exception here is work on conflict diffusion by Most and Starr (1989) and by Siverson and Starr (1991).
7. Long cycles researchers have sought to highlight the conflict dynamics and rivalry relationships that extend over space and time. Long cycle theories posit overarching conflict relationship over time that spans centuries through systemic causal linkages. Long cycles theories establish general patterns, but it is unable to identify specifics of the conflict relationships. The difference between long cycle theories and rivalry/ recurring conflict approaches is that the rivalry/recurring conflict do not treat wars as a function of time, but treat them as a function of rivalry relationship that produce conflicts (Modelski & Thompson, 1989).
8. India–Pakistan cricket games always generate intense nationalism. Every time these two teams meet, it generates enormous interest with strong political overtones reminiscent of US–USSR meetings in the Olympics during the Cold War. Since the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, all bilateral cricketing relationship has been suspended.
9. On the corporatist dimension of the Pakistani army, see Bennet-Jones (2003).
10. A similar point was made by Huntington in the *Clash of Civilizations* piece published in *Foreign Affairs* (summer 1993) in which he proposed that the fundamental source of major conflicts would be ideological.
11. Available at: http://www.personal.psu.edu/dsb10/datasets.htm

12. See Failed State Index 2013, http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2012-sortable; Carment and Samy (2012).
13. Data sourced from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm
14. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Chapter 2. India and Pakistan, 10 September 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/09/10/chapter-2-india-and-pakistan/
15. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, Chapter 2. India and Pakistan, 10 September 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/09/10/chapter-2-india-and-pakistan/

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